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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DISABLED AMERICAN VETERANS, 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
VETERANS, FOUND,ATION, 
a purported non-profit corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case 
No. 8980 
Counsel for appellant shall refer in this brief to the 
"Disabled American Veterans, Utah State Department," as 
"Plaintiff", to all the defendants as shown in the pleadings 
of the lower court, with the exception of Orlo L. Ellison, as 
"Defendants"; to the "Veterans Foundation, a non-profit cor-
poration", as "appellant". 
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It should be noted that the true and proper name of 
Plaintiff is "Department of Utah Disabled American Vet-
erans." That said Departme~t is an unincorporated asso-
ciation chartered by the Disabled American Veterans, a 
national organization, and as such is no part of the govern-
ing body of the State of Utah, its agencies, or departments. 
The members of the Department of Utah DAV, are "all the 
active DAV chapters in the State of Utah which have been or 
are hereby chartered by the National Department so long 
as such chapter remains in good standing .... ", as shown 
in Article IV, Section I, of the Department of Utah, DAV 
Constitution. Further, Article VII, Sections, I, 3, and 4, 
of said constitution provide for a "State Executive Committee 
consisting of the immediate past Department Commander, the 
elected Department officers and one executive committee-
man elected from each active chapter . . . .", That ... "the 
Executive Committee shall have the determination by a 
majority vote over all legislative, administrative, and execu-
tive matters not otherwise specifically covered by the pro· 
visions of this constitution or by action of the state 
convention." That ... "a majority of the members of the 
Executive Committee shall be necessary to constitute a quorum 
in order to perform the functions of their office. Each com· 
mittee member present shall be entitled to one vote ... " 
Appellant is a duly organized and validly existing non· 
profit corporation, organized under the laws of the state of 
Utah, and Defendants, other than Veterans Foundation, a 
non-profit corporation, Tracy Astle, and Orlo L. Ellison, 
are, or have been officers and Directors of Appellant Cor· 
poration. Tracy Astle is a past State Commander of 
Plaintiff. Orlo L. Ellison is a business man who has oprated 
successfully a number of salvage stores in other parts of the 
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United States. On or about September 9, 1952, · Orlo L. 
Ellison entered into an agreement with Plaintiff wherein 
Ellison was to operate a salvage and thrift store, to be known 
as Veterans Foundation and wherein Plaintiff was to sponsor 
contacts and otherwise cooperate, assist, and support said 
business, and Plaintiff was to receive therefore 10 per cent 
of the gross sales of said business, which, .as a fund raising 
project, would go to the purpose of assisting Disabled 
American Veterans. (See Exhibit "A" attached to Plain-
tiff's Complaint, R-9, 10). It was contemplated by this 
agreement that some years in the future this business, if 
successful, could be bought out by the Veterans organization, 
and in fact about three years later, in February, 1956, this 
was consummated. During negotiations for the purchase 
of the thrift store, Mr. Ellison took the definite position, 
in view of his past experience in these matters, that under 
no condition would he risk selling the business directly to 
Plaintiff because of the politics that could be involved and 
the subsequent risk of failure of the business, but that he 
would deal directly with an independent corporation author-
ized by the Veterans organization in this state that was com-
pletely divorced and independent of the politics of said 
Plaintiff's organization. (See Page 15, subparagraph ( 4) 
of Defendant's Answer, R-76). Consequently, after careful 
study and consideration by the State Executive Committee 
of Plaintiff organization, a resolution was adopted by said 
Executive Committee approving the formation of the non-
profit corporation known as "Veterans Foundation" and its 
Articles of Incorporation, and further authorized the assign-
ment of said Plaintiff's interest to Appellant. The said 
resolution, as adopted on December 4, 1955, is as follows: 
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"The State Executive Meeting of the Department 
of Utah Disabled American Veterans hereby assem-
bled in Salt Lake City, Utah, this 4th day of Decem-
ber, 1955, after hearing the report of the State 
Commander and his committee in the forming of a 
non-profit corporation for the purpose of entering 
into a contract with Orlo L. Ellison for the purchase 
of the Veterans Foundation known as the Veterans 
Thrift Shop and it appearing that the same is for the 
best interest of the disabled veterans of Utah. 
"We hereby go on record as approving said action 
of said committee in forming the non-profit corpora-
tion known as the 'Veterans Foundation' and in 
order to carry into effect the purpose of said cor-
poration, hereby authorize the State Commander 
and Adjutant to execute an assignment to the said 
new non-profit corporation, the 'Veterans Founda-
tion,' of the agreement dated the 9th day of September, 
1952, between the State Department of Utah, Dis-
abled American Veterans and Orlo L. Ellison which 
it is understood shall be cancelled by mutual consent 
at the time said Veterans Foundation, a non-profit 
corporation, and said Orlo L. Ellison enter into a 
sales agreement. 
"It is further understood that the said Veterans 
Foundation, a non-profit corporation shall be oper-
ated principally for and on behalf of the disabled 
veterans as more particularly outlined in Article IV 
of the Articles of Incorporation of said 'Veterans 
Foundation' and that out of the net profits of said 
corporation an amount equal to 10 per cent of the 
gross sales shall be paid to the Department of Utah 
Disabled American Veterans by said Veterans Foun· 
dation and as much more as may be possible shall 
be used for the objects of said corporation's crea· 
tion, all of which is to be consistent with good business 
practice. 
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"After some discussion on the resolution, and it was 
pointed out that Mr. Ellison was on the verge of 
breaking his contract with the Department, a motion 
was made by Carlson, State Department, that this 
resolution he adopted and approved. This motion 
was seconded by Gray, State Department, and the 
following roll call vote was taken: 
For the Adoption 
Ford, Sr. Vice Commander yes 
Schmidt, 1st Jr. Vice Commander 
Dover, 2nd Jr. Vice Commander yes 
Carlson, 3rd Jr. Vice Commander yes 
Brusatto, Chaplain 
Edwards, Sgt. of Arms 
Gray, Jr. Past Commander 
Johnson, Chapter No. 1 
Lutesinger, Chapter No. 2 
Chapter No.3 
Trunkey, Chapter No. 4 
Enger, Chapter No. 6 
Chapter No. 7 
Shockey, Chapter No. 8 
Chapter No. 9 
Chapter No. 10 
















There were eight votes for the adoption of the resolu-
tion, and three against adoption. The motion car-
ried and the resolution was adopted. (R-93, 94, 
95, 96). 
Subsequently, about December 15, 1955, the Articles 
of Incorporation of Appellant were filed in the office of the 
Secretary of State, as shown in (R-16), Exhibit "D" of Plain-
tiff's Complaint. Then on February 17, 1956, Plaintiff 
assigned to Appellant its interest in the agreement with 
Ellison. This assignment is shown as Exhibit "E" in Plain-
tiff's Complaint (R-22), and the purpose of the assignment 
is noted as follows: 
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"That the said Veterans Foundation is to be an inde-
pendent non-profit corporation and shall operate the 
business which is the subject of said agreement, with 
said Orlo L. Ellison, after purchasing the same from 
him for and on behalf of disabled veterans, as set out 
in the Articles of Incorporation of said Veterans Foun-
dation." 
Orlo L. Ellison then sold and assigned his interest 
in the business to Appellant under a Bill of Sale and title 
retaining note and agreement as shown in Exhibit "F'' 
of Plaintiff's Complaint (R-24). It is to be noted also that 
under said agreement, Paragraph 6, Mr. Ellison has "an 
exclusive general management or supervisory contract as to 
the entire business," until he is paid out in full. 
Plaintiff had received the sum of $56,192.75 up to 
March 31, 1958, from the time the store commenced oper-
ation in September, 1952, and $29,962.26 of that sum 
was received since the corporation was organized. 
That thousands of dollars have been paid to Orlo 
Ellison on the purchase price of the business and in addi-
tion, Appellant has acquired its own building in the heart 
of Salt Lake City. That said business has grown and 
developed well. Since Appellant corporation was orgai].ized, 
and after being passed upon and adopted by Plaintiff and 
the State Executive Committee, however, opposition devel-
oped on the part of certain individuals within the Veterans 
organization against Appellant and its officers and direc-
tors. As a result, the national organization was brought into 
the picture, a full study made of the Appellant corporation, 
and recommendations were made for amending Appellant's 
Article of Incorporation as follows: 
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"A. The assignment of the interest of the De-
partment of Utah in the contract with Mr. Orlo Elli-
son for the operation of a salvage business, which 
assignment goes to a non-profit corporation called 
'The Veterans Foundation' is approved upon condi-
tion that the Articles of Incorporation of the Vet-
erans Foundation be amended to provide as follows: 
"l. Article IV, Paragraph A, be amended to 
provide that the purpose of the Corporation shall be 
to operate and conduct a Salavage Business for the 
purpose of raising funds for use by the Department 
of Utah, Disabled American Veterans. 
"2. Article VI expressly provide that no mem-
ber of the Board of Directors, as such, shall receive 
any salary. 
3. Article VI be amended to provide that no 
persons shall be selected as a member of the Board 
of Directors unless his selection is approved by a 
majority vote at a DAV Department of Utah conven-
tion. 
"That any one or more of the members of the 
Board of Directors of the corporation may be recalled 
and removed by a two-thirds affirmative vote of the 
delegates at any State Convention. 
"4. That the Articles expressly provide that 
upon the dissolution of the Corporation, its assets 
remaining after payment of its obligations shall be 
delivered to the Department of Utah, DAV. 
"That the Articles further expressly provide that 
no Amendment thereto shall be effective until ratified 
by a majority vote of the delegates at an Annual Con-
vention of the Department of Utah, DAV." 
(The full text of the National Executive Committee's 
letter is set out as an attachment to Plaintiff's Answer 
to Interrogatories, R-101) 
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Subsequently, Appellant prepared and filed Amended 
Articles of Incorporation on or about February 21, 1957, 
and shown as Exhibit "H" in Plaintiff's Complaint (R-32). 
Then on or about September 28, 1957, Amendments to the 
Amended Articles of Incorporation were filed (R-39, 41). 
That said amendments were drafted and prepared for the 
most part by Plaintiff and their counsel, and that after 
everything all seemed to he in order and the opposing 
parties satisfied, a special meeting was called of the Ap-
pellant members after due and proper notice and the 
amendments were adopted by at least two-thirds of the 
members present, as shown in Exhibit "I" of Plaintiff's 
Complaint (R-39, 41). The then State Commander, James 
Brussatto, and Woolas A. Macey, together with Plaintiff's 
attorney, had approved of these amendents before the special 
meeting was called and before Appellant formally approved 
and filed the same. This approval was by letter dated Sep-
tember 9, 1957, and is as follows (R-103): 
"Pursuant to our telephone conversation this morn-
ning I am writing you requesting that the Veterans 
Foundation formally adopt and file the amendments 
to its Articles of Incorporation in the manner which 
we have previously agreed to. It is our understand-
ing that the Board of Directors of the Veterans F oun-
dation have already agreed to these amendents and 
their minutes will show this approval. We now un-
derstand that the amendments must be approved by 
the members of the Foundation, and that you will 
immediately advertise notice of a members meeting 
for the purpose of acting on these amendements. 
"I have been authorized to state that just as soon as 
the amendments are adopted and filed with the Secre-
tary of State's office that the State Department 
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officers will submit the amendments to the chapters 
throughout the State of Utah and to the National 
office for ratification and approval. I have re-
quested the Commander of the State Department and 
the Adjutant to sign this letter so that you will know 
that they have approved the contents and agreed to 
this procedure. 
"We also request an early opportunity to discuss with 
the Board the naming of Mr. Perry to the holdover 
position now occupied by Roy A. Hendrikson. 
"We believe that with completion of these steps that 
harmony can and will prevail in the operations of the 
Veterans Foundation. I am sure that we both realize 
that it has taken a good deal of patience to reach this 
point in our negotiations, and I sincerely hope that 
they can be quickly wound up in harmony. We 
would appreciate your acknowledging this letter so 
that we might advise other officers and chapter of-
ficers throughout the State of the progress that is 
being and has been made in these matters. 
Sincerely, 
I sl Max K. Mangum 
I sl James Brusatto 
I sl W oolas A. Macey" 
That, even after these promises and the changes and 
amendments and apparent harmony prevailing, Plaintiff, 
through its State Commander, James Brusatto, liefused to 
submit to all the chapters or to the national organization 
the project for their further approval, and in fact indicated 
to the Board of Directors of Appellant corporation on March 
22, 1958, that the Plaintiff never would cooperate with Ap-
pellant. (See Exhibit "G", Paragraph ( 4) of Plaintiff's 
Complaint (R-29), (R-57), also, Plaintiff's Answers to 
Defendant's Interrogatories, Numbers 17 (g) and 17 (h) 
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(R-88, 89). That Plaintiff continued to receive about 
$1,500.00 or more each month from Appellant, but refused 
to give cooperation to the project, and in fact continued to 
fight Appellant and its officers and directors attempting to 
discredit them before the local chapters and the national 
organization. 
Consequently, on March 27, 1958, Appellant served 
notioe upon Plaintiff that the payments to them would be 
terminated and that in accordance with the Articles of In-
corporation, the money would be paid to the local chapters 
of the State of Utah (R-29). Plaintiff, through its State 
Commander, James Brusatto, then instituted this law suit 
by filing a Complaint and setting forth three causes of action. 
The first cause of action asked for judgment restraining and 
enjoining Defendants from ceasing the payments and re-
questing an order that the payments be continued to Plaintiff 
pending the final determination of the matter. The second 
cause of action prayed for a dissolution of said Appellant 
corporation, which cause of action was later abandoned by 
Plaintiff. The third cause of action requested an order for 
the removal of Appellant officers and directors and for a 
special meeting to be held for the nomination and election 
of a new Board of Directors of Appellant corporation. 
Defendants and Appellant resisted this suit by filing a de-
tailed Answer. Before any pre-trial was had or any hearing 
on the merits, Defendants and Appellant filed a motion for 
Summary Judgment (R-107). That at the time of the 
scheduled hearing on said motion, no evidence was taken, 
but an informal discussion was had with the court by the 
attorneys for both sides. That at that time counsel for 
Plaintiff also made a motion for Summary judgment for 
the relief demanded in Plaintiffs Complaint ( R -110). The 
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court took the motions under advisement after giving an 
opportunity for counsel to submit memorandums, which was 
done. Thereafter, the court entered its Order in the case, 
over the filed objections to said Order made by counsel for 
Defendants and Appellant (R-125). This appeal, there-
fore, is taken from that part of the lower court's Order that 
was against Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF, AS AN UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIA-
TION IS NOT A PROPER PARTY TO BRING SUIT IN 
THE UTAH COURTS AGAINST DEFENDANTS AND 
APPELLANT, AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN 
ALLOWING THE SAME. 
POINT II 
THE ORDER OF THE COURT REQUIRING DEFEN-
DANTS AND APPELLANT TO AMEND AND CHANGE 
ARTICLE IV OF APPELLANT'S ARTICLES OF INCOR-
PORATION IS IMPROPER, WITHOUT FOUNDATION, 
AND BEYOND THE POWER AND PROVINCE OF 
THE COURT. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING AN UNCONDI-
TIONAL ORDER ENJOINING DEFENDANTS AND AP-
PELLANT FROM FURTHER WITHHOLDING PAY-
MENTS TO PLAINTIFF OF TEN PERCENT OF THE 
GROSS VOLUME OF SALES OF THE VETERANS 
FOUNDATION, A NON-PROFIT CORPORATION. 
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PLAINTIFF, AS AN UNINCORPORATED ASSO-
CIATION, IS NOT A PROPER PARTY TO BRING SUIT 
IN THE UTAH COURTS AGAINST DEFENDANTS AND 
APPELLANT, AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN 
ALLOWING THE SAME. 
Plaintiff, as the Department of Utah, Disabled Ameri-
can Veterans, is an unincorporated association, and has no 
capacity as such to sue in its own name in the Utah Courts. 
Plaintiff has not sued in the name of the fourteen local 
chapters of the Disabled American Veterans, some of which 
are incorporated, and others of which are not, nor has Plain-
tiff sued in the name of the National DAV Corporation. 
It is true that under Utah law Plaintiff, as a mere asso-
ciation, may he sued in its common name by others. Rule 
17 (d) rules of civil procedure of Utah Code Annotated 1953 
provides for this as follows: 
"(d) ASSOCIATES MAY BE SUED BY COMMON 
NAME. When two or more persons associated in 
any business either as a joint-stock company, a part-
nership or other association, not a corporation, trans-
act such business under a common name, whether it 
comprises the name of such associates or not, they 
may he sued by such common name; and any judg-
ment obtained against the defendant in such case shall 
bind the joint property of all the associates in the 
same manner as if all had been named defendants 
and had been sued upon their joint liability." 
It does not follow, however, that the mere fact that an 
association may he sued in its common name allows such 
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association to institute an action in its own name. The law 
on this point seems quite clear to the contrary. In the notes 
under Rule 17 (d) of the 1957 Pocket Supplement we read 
the following: 
"Associations may not institute actions in own name. 
"While law of Utah confers upon an unincorporated 
association sufficient status to be sued in its own 
name as a party defendant it includes no provision 
and no authority permitting such an association to 
institute an action in its own name as a party plain-
tiff. Statutes which authorize suits against an associ-
ation in its common or associate name do not confer a 
mutual or reciprocal privilege permitting such asso-
ciations to institute litigation in their own name. 
American Newspaper Guild v. Mackinnon, 108 F. 
Supp. 312." 
On Page 313, Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the above cited 
case is found what counsel for Appellant believes and con-
tends is the Utah law, and is quoted as follows: 
"The general common law rule is that an unincor-
porated association has no legal entity aside from its 
members and has, therefore, no standing and no 
capacity as a party litigant in its own name." 
"While the law of Utah includes enabling legislation, 
which confers upon an unincorporated association 
sufficient status to be sued in its own name as a party 
defendant, it includes no provision and no authority 
permitting such an association to institute an action 
in its own name as a party plaintiff. It has been 
held repeatedly that statutes which authorize suits 
against an association in its common or associate 
name, do not confer a mutual or reciprocal privilege 
permitting such associations to institute litigation in 
their own name." 
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Counsel for plaintiff cited in his memorandum before 
the lower Court the case of Busby v. Electric Utilities Em-
ployees Union, 147 Fed. (2nd) 865 in support of his view. 
We shall not in this brief go into an argument on This 
District of Columbia Court's ruling and the special nature of 
Union organizations, but we feel it should be sufficient to 
point out that the Federal Court in the American Newspaper 
Guild v. Mackinnon case above cited specifically refused to 
hold with the Busby case for the reason that the Court had 
to resolve the question according to the law of the forum, 
which in this case was the State of Utah. The Court went on 
to say: 
"If this Court were to adopt and follow the rule of the 
Busby case, it would, in effect, usurp the functions 
of either the judicial or legislative bodies of the State 
of Utah. It would, for purposes of this case, change 
the existing law of that State." 
In 4 American Jurisprudence, Section 36 at Page 478, 
appellant is further supported in its position: 
"An association may protect its rights against third 
persons by instituting legal proceedings, although in 
the absence of statutory authority for bringing suits 
in the name of an unincorporated association or 
statutory recognition of such bodies as legal entities, 
such actions must be brought in the name of all the 
members or by some person acting in a representa-
tive capacity, and not in the name of the association." 
Again, Section 46 of 4 American Juris prudence, Page 
485 points up the well established rule as follows: 
"It is a well-established rule that in the absence of 
enabling or permissive statute, an unincorporated as-
sociation cannot sue or be sued in the association 
name. The reason is, that such an association or 
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society, in the absence of statutes recognizing it, has 
no legal entity distinct from that of its members." See 
also Pearson v. Anderburg, (Utah) 80 P. 307. 
It should be noted also that the California Statute, 
Section 388 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, is 
very similar to our Utah Statute, Rule 17 (d) of The Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 1953, above cited, which allows 
unincorporated associations to be sued in their own name. 
However, this does not give license to such association to 
institute suit in its own name as is pointed out in "Case v. 
Kadota Fig Association of Producers" (Calif.) 220 p2nd 
912, wherein the Court stated: 
"In California, persons associated in business under 
a common name may be sued under that name (Sec-
tion 388 of Calif. Code of Civil Procedure). How-
ever, this statutory relaxation of the common law 
applies only to associated defendants. Associated 
plaintiffs still must sue in their individual names." 
Again the case of "Juneau Spruce Corporation v. Interna-
tional Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union et al," 
235 p2nd 607 (Calif.) is in support of the law that the 
entity theory is rejected except where specifically provided 
for by statute, and the fact that the statute allows suit against 
an association, "it does not follow that the association may be 
regarded as an entity for all other purposes." 
Counsel for appellant submits, therefore, that even 
though the name of an agent upon whom process or demands 
against Disabled American Veterans may be served has 
been filed in the office of the Secretary of State in Utah, 
this does not give license nor authority to plaintiff, as a 
mere association, to sue in its own name under our Utah 
Statutes, and we further submit that the lower Court, in view 
of this law erred in not dismissing plaintiff's Complaint. 
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POINT II 
THE ORDER OF THE COURT REQUIRING DE-
FENDANTS AND APPELLANT TO AMEND AND 
CHANGE ARTICLE IV OF APPELLANT'S ARTICLES 
OF INCORPORATION IS IMPROPER, WITHOUT 
FOUNDATION, AND BEYOND THE POWER AND 
PROVINCE OF THE COURT. 
The law appears to be quite clear that the courts will 
not substitute their judgment for that of corporate officers 
and directors nor should the courts interfere with the internal 
affairs of a corporation. 
In 13 American Jurisprudence, Page 498, Section 452, 
we find the following: 
"DISPUTES OVER CORPORATE MANAGE-
MENT AND POLICIES. The majority stockholders 
of a corporation have an undisputable right, in the 
absence of fraud, to manage the corporate affairs 
within the powers possessed by such corporation, and 
courts of equity will not, as a general rule, exercise 
jurisdiction at the instance of shareholders in a cor-
poration to control or interfere in the management 
of the corporate or internal affairs of the corporation. 
They have no power to interpose their authority for 
the purpose of adjusting controversies that have 
arisen among the shareholders or directors of a cor-
poration relative to the proper mode of conducting 
the corporate business as they may have in case of 
a similar controversy arising between the members 
of an ordinary partnership. Mere errors of judg-
ment on the part of the officers or majority stock-
holders are not sufficient as grounds for the inter· 
ference of equity at the instance of minority stock-
holders. The breach of duty by a corporation, 
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authorizing equitable relief by a shareholder, does 
not refer to mere mismanagement or neglect of the 
officers or directors in the control of corporate affairs 
or the abuse of discretion lodged in them in the con-
duct of the corporation business. The courts do not 
interfere on these grounds; to authorize or to justify 
interference, there must be actual or threatened in· 
jurious acts ultra vires, fraudulent and injurious 
practices abuse of power, or oppression on the part 
of the corporation or its officers which are clearly 
subversive of the rights of the minority or of a stock-
holder and which, without such suits, would leave 
him remediless." 
In the case at bar, the members of appellant corporation 
are endowed with the same rights and privileges as stock-
holders in corporations for profit. In the first place, Plain-
tiff is not even a member of appellant corporation, nor is it 
representing the members, but even if Plaintiff were a 
member and had capacity to sue (which it does not), then 
the courts would not have power to interfere without a show· 
ing of fraud or ultra vires acts or injurious practices. In our 
case, there was no evidence taken, nor do the pleadings show 
any justification for interference by the court. The plead-
ings do show that there has been a fight between certain 
factions in the matter of just where the control of the 
appellant corporation should be. 
Counsel for Appellant feels that It IS important and 
necessary for the court in this matter to know and under-
stand that the question of political control by a few in this 
fund raising project with the Disabled American Veterans 
of this state is of no small moment. That a careful analysis 
of the Constitution of Department of Utah Disabled Ameri-
can Veterans, and particularly Article V will show that the 
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supreme power of Plaintiff organization is vested in a state 
convention and that the voting power is such that one or two 
of the fourteen chapters within the state may control affairs 
merely by reason of having large memberships shown on 
their books, regardless of who is present at said convention 
to consider important matters. Thus, a very few in control 
of one or two of the large chapters may in essence control the 
entire Plaintiff organization within the state. · For this rea-
son at the time appellant corporation was contemplated in 
1955 and 1956, it was determined by the State Executive 
Committee, wherein all the chapters were represented in the 
state as well as the officers of Plaintiff association, that 
Veterans Foundation should be established as a corporation 
separate and apart from the usual political control of a few 
within the DAV organization, (R-22, 76). Consequently, 
the articles of incorporation of Veterans Foundation were 
drafted with this specifically in mind and approved by Plain-
tiff (R-95), and Appellant became a valid, existing corpora-
tion under the laws of the state of Utah. Since its incor-
poration, a few individuals within the DA V of this state have 
managed to control the state offices and also to convince the 
National DAV Corporation, that the fund raising project in 
Utah should not be approved nationally until complete con-
trol is placed in the plaintiff organization. This, of course, 
would only result in changing officers and directors of 
appellant corporation with each change of DA V officers at 
the whim of the political leaders, and it was this very thing 
that the corporation was designed to prevent. Further, none 
of the officers or directors of Appellant receive any material 
benefit by serving the corporation, and many hours of work 
have been put in without remuneration by the present direc-
tors and officers of Appellant. Therefore, there is a greater 
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fiduciary duty upon said officers and directors to serve and 
handle affairs of the corporation on behalf of all American 
veterans who are its members, rather than on behalf of a few 
controlling the plaintiff organization. 
There is no question but that the money raised by 
Appellant belongs to the Veterans and is to be used for and 
on their behalf, but the Veterans organizations must either 
approve the project and give support to it, or discontinue 
taking the money raised, in fairness to Orlo L. Ellison and 
the public. The chapters within the state are, after all, the 
organizations where the charitable service is primarily per-
formed, and for the Appellant to decide to pay the moneys 
to said chapters, all in accordance with its articles of incor-
poration, after Plaintiff indicated they would never coop-
erate, (R-29), was only proper, and in keeping with its 
fiduciary relation to all its members. Thousands of dollars 
have gone to Plaintiff from Appellant and a great amount 
of this has been used for the sole purpose of fighting appellant 
and its officers and directors, and in the past Plaintiff has 
been requested to make an accounting as to what the money 
has been used for, but Plaintiff has refused to so account, 
(R-80, 85). Now it has been Appellant's contention that 
the majority of the DAV members, who make up the chap-
ters as well as appellant corporation, have approved or 
would readily approve the fund raising project and appellant 
corporation if given a proper opportunity to do so. The 
corporation and project was originally approved in this state, 
as has been pointed out in this brief, but after recommenda-
tions for changes in the articles of incorporation were made 
by the national organization and those changes made and 
approved by Plaintiff, and the appellant corporate members 
(R-39, 103), the further approval was not requested of all 
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the chapters or of the national organization. Plaintiff has 
refused to do so in violation of their promises and moral 
obligations. In spite of this, however, it does not mean that 
Appellant is not a validly operating Utah corporation, and 
for the lower court to arbitrarily step in and make a manda-
tory order that Appellant change its articles of incorporation 
without hearing any evidence, and without even being pleaded 
by Plaintiff, is wrong, beyond the power and jurisdiction of 
the court, and would certainly work an injustice upon the 
Appellant corporate members who have approved said 
articles. 
In the case of Wall v. Board of Regents of the Uni-
versity of California, 102 P. 2nd 533, the court said: 
"In absence of fraudulent conduct on part of those 
who have been lawfully entrusted with management 
and conduct of the corporations affairs, a court has 
no power or right to intermeddle with internal affairs 
of a corporation, and authority of a corporation's 
directors in conduct of corporation's business must be 
regarded as absolute when directors act within the 
law, and a court cannot substitute its judgment for 
that of the directors." 
See also in support of this position the following cita-
tions: 124 ALR 359; Briggs v. Scripps, 56 P 2nd 277; 
Campbell v. Clark, 324 P 2nd 51. 
It is Appellant's further contention that the proper 
way to work out the problems of control and other internal 
corporate matters is through the lawful avenues provided in 
Appellant's articles of incorporation and through other reme-
dies provided within the DA V Organization. In the constitu-
tion of plaintiff association, Article II, Section 3, it states: 
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"Each chapter agrees for itself and its members that 
it will not bring any action or proceeding in any court 
of law or equity against this Department or any chap-
ter or member thereof or against the National De-
partment or its officers or any officer of this 
Department until all remedies provided by this con-
stitution and by National Constitution, By-laws and 
lawful mandates have been fully exhausted." 
Plaintiff filed its law suit against DAV members and 
Appellant immediately after receiving notice from Appel-
lant that the funds normally paid it were going to be 
terminated and paid to the chapters instead. Plaintiff made 
no attempt to call a meeting of DAV members, Appellant 
directors or members, or to exhaust other remedies available. 
The lower court, therefore, should not have interfered in this 
case without making a full determination of whether all 
remedies available had been exhausted. 
The law is clear on this point. In 13 American Juris-
prudence, page 500, Section 454 it states: 
"If injury results to a shareholder in a corporation by 
an abuse of corporate power, the wrong must be 
redressed within the corporation if possible. A stock-
holder cannot maintain suit against the corporation to 
redress a corporate wrong until he has done all in 
his power to obtain within such corporation redress 
for the wrong complained of." 
Counsel for appellant contends that even assuming 
plaintiff's having capacity to sue, that insmuch as plaintiff 
is not a member of appellant corporation nor sueing on 
behalf of said members, nor sueing its officers and directors 
on behalf of the corporation, plaintiff still would not be a 
proper party to maintain this action and the lower Court 
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should have dismissed plaintiff's Complaint and taken no 
part in the matter. See 13 American Jurisprudence Page 
968, Section 1015. 
Counsel for appellant can find no precedence in the 
law to justify the lower Court's action in ordering a change 
of appellant Articles of Incorporation. These Articles of 
Incorporation are provided for by statute, and amendments 
or changes to validly organized and existing corporations 
mnst of necessity take place in accordance with the pro-
vi8ions of said articles and by statute (see 16-2-45 of Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953). Otherwise disorder would pre-
vail. The Articles of Incorporation of appellant corpora-
tion, article IX of Amendments, provide that "at least two-
thirds of the members present at any annual meeting, or at 
a special meeting called for the purpose, shall approve the 
the amendment", (R-37). Now we submit that the ruling 
of the lower Court ordering the amendment to article IV 
presents a dilemma. Should the officers and directors of 
appellant fail to make the required amendment they are 
subject to the contempt of the Court, and if the members of 
appellant corporation, who must concur in the amendment 
refuse to so concur, then shall the members as well as the 
officers and directors be subject to contempt proceedings? 
How can the Court substitute its judgment for that of the 
corporate members? 
Article IV of Appellant's Articles of Incorporation has 
been approved not only by appellant's members but by 
plaintiff as well, (R-39, 40, 103), and what's more, plaintiff 
neither pleaded nor prayed for such ruling of the Court. 
(See Miller v. Johnson (Utah) 134 U. 1017, Also 41 Ameri-
can Jurisprudence 555). 
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We therefore strongly contend that in view of these 
circumstances, the mandatory order of the Court is entirely 
improper, without foundation in the law, and certainly 
beyond the power and jurisdiction of the Court. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING AN UNCONDI-
TIONAL ORDER ENJOINING DEFENDANTS AND 
APPELLANT FROM FURTHER WITHHOLDING PAY-
MENTS TO PLAINTIFF OF TEN PERCENT OF THE 
GROSS VOLUME OF SALES OF THE VETERANS 
FOUNDATION, A NON-PROFIT CORPORATION. 
In order to obtain injunctive relief in a Court of 
Equity, there must be no adequate remedy at law, such 
relief must be necessary to attain justice and other remedies 
and procedures exhausted, a showing of irreparable damage 
or injury, coming into court with clean hands, and other 
equitable principles satisfied. Further, the Court should 
cautiously proceed in the matter. In "Kelly v. Kelly Spring-
field Tire Co.", 152 Atl. 166, the court states: 
"There is no power, exercise of which is more deli-
cate, or which requires greater caution, deliberation 
and sound discretion, and which is more dangerous in 
a doubtful case, than that to enjoin corporate officers 
and agents from exercise of privileges and franchises 
of a corporation." 
If ever there was a doubtful case, it is the one at bar, 
and for the Court to interfere by injunctive orders is to merely 
play into the hands of a few political DAV leaders seeking 
complete control of Appellant Corporation. Again, in the 
case of "Willis v. Lauridson", 118 P. 530, the court cautions: 
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"To issue an injunction is the exercise of a delicate 
power, requiring great caution and sound discretion 
and rarely, if ever, should be exercised in a doubtful 
case." 
Counsel for appellant contends that plaintiff had not 
exhausted its remedies as heretofore mentioned, that plain-
tiff, further, had a remedy at law in Quo Warranto Pro-
ceedings if it felt there was some foundation for the 
allegations made, that there was never any showing of irre-
parable injury or damage, and whether plaintiff came into 
court with clean hands is at least questionable in view of 
the facts and pleadings set out in this case. In addition 
plaintiff was not a proper party to ask for injunctive relief. 
(See 28 American Jurisprudence, Page 350, Section 159). 
From Fletcher Cyclopedia on Corporations, Vol. 10, 
Page 297, the following is quoted: 
"Courts will enjoin the acts of the properly constituted 
management at the instance of a stockholder, only 
where the mangement abuses its powers and acts il-
legally or fraudulently to the irreparable injury of 
complaining stockholders and with resultant impaire-
ment or destruction of the corporate franchises, busi-
ness, or assets." 
Appellant officers and directors acted only within the 
scope of their Articles, and then not to impair or destroy the 
corporate business and assets, but to preserve them. From 
the same text above cited, Fletcher continues: 
"So long as the Directors or officers act within their 
legal powers and not fraudulently, injunction will not 
issue to control the discretion lodged in them in re-
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spect to the internal affairs and conduct of the cor-
poration." See also, Skeen v. Warren Irrigation Co. 
(Utah) 132 P. 1162; 28 American Jurisprudence 
277) 
Further, that to unconditionally order that defendants 
and appellant be enjoined from further withholding pay-
ments to the plaintiff of 10% of the gross volume of sales 
of the Veterans Foundation, raises a serious question as 
to the carrying out of the further powers of said corporation 
under Article four of its Articles of Incorpation now on 
file, and specifically paragraph B under what is denoted, 
"General Powers". That the next to last sentence under the 
general powers clause of Article 4(b) reads as follows: 
"It shall also have the power to make such expendi-
tures, to take such steps as the Board of Directors 
may deem necessary to carry out the ultimate ob-
jectives of the corporation, as will tend to build its 
prestige before the public, including among other 
things, the requirement from time to time of detailed 
reports of said State Department or chapters of the 
Disabled Veterans, as the case may be, showing what 
the money received by them from this corporation 
was used for, with the power to withhold further 
payments to them if the money has been unjudiciously 
spent and has not been used to substantially carry 
out the objects of the corporation as set out in para-
graph A of this Article." 
That Veterans Foundation, a non-profit corporation, has 
heretofore requested a report from the State Department in 
connection with the use of the moneys but has been refused, 
and surely there ought to be some checks on the use of these 
funds raised through the public. 
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We contend, therefore, that a case for injunctive relief 
was not made out by plaintiff, and that the court was in error 
to unconditionally enjoin any further withholding of pay-
ments to plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that the orders and 
rulings of the lower Court enjoining appellant and requir-
ing said corporation, its officers and directors to change its 
Articles of Incorporation, be modified and reversed. That 
the plaintiff is not a proper party to this law suit, and that 
the lower Court's decision in allowing the same should be 
reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHILD, SPAFFORD & YOUNG 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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